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United States-Cuba Normalized Relations
and the MLB Influence: The Baseball
Coalition Committee
Aaron Klein*
Jake E. Marcus**
This note explores the past, present, and future of the
path for Cuban baseball players into MLB. Specifically, this
note will explore the late-2014 agreement between the
United States and Cuba to normalize relations and its anticipated impact on MLB. Part I provides an extensive historical context of the relationship between the two countries
with a focus on the effect that baseball has had on the relationship. Part II draws attention to MLB’s current policies
and the resulting hardships faced by Cuban baseball players
embark on the journey from Serie Nacional to MLB. Part III
concentrates on the legal issues arising out of the circuitous
emigration process for Cuban baseball players to make
MLB. Part IV outlines the wealth of literature on Cuban
baseball and details the proposed solutions offered by other
scholars on the matter. Part V explains the development of
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the normalization agreement between the United States and
Cuba and predicts its impact on MLB. Finally, Part V proposes framework to enhance the safety involved with the emigration process and efficiency of the troubling issue while
utilizing the normalized relations platform to align incentives for Cuba and the United States.
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On June 28, 2012, the Los Angeles Dodgers reached a sevenyear-agreement worth $42 million with Cuban-born-turned-Mexican-resident Yasiel Puig.1 After a little less than a year, Puig made
his Major League debut in the Dodger-blue on June 2, 2013.2 Immediately, he took the league by storm. For the month of June, Puig
earned both the National League Rookie of the Month and National
League Player of the Month awards, marking the first time in Major
League Baseball (“MLB”) history a player had done so in their debut month.3 Puig continued to dazzle the world of baseball throughout the season, making highlight catches in the outfield, hitting
mammoth home runs, and displaying one of the strongest throwing
arms in the entire league. Despite playing in only 104 games, Puig
finished second in the National League Rookie of the Year voting
behind fellow Cuban José Fernández.4
Throughout the season, the Cuban outfielder was an enigma.
Along with headlines about his play on the field came rumblings
regarding the circumstances of his escape from Cuba. This led to a
sea of rumors—that he was a spy for the Cuban government, that he
continued to face death threats from those that helped him escape,
and that he had betrayed his fellow countrymen in exchange for freedom.5 On the eve of the 2014 MLB season, two reporters—Jesse

1
Jesse Sanchez, Dodgers Sign Cuban Puig to Seven-Year Deal, THE
OFFICIAL SITE OF THE LOS ANGELES DODGERS (June 29, 2012), http://m.dodgers.mlb.com/news/article/34081436/ [hereinafter Sanchez].
2
Austin Laymance, Pair of Homers Plus Puig’s Defense Lift Dodgers, THE
OFFICIAL SITE OF THE LOS ANGELES DODGERS (June 4, 2013, 2:47 AM),
http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/gameday/index.jsp?gid=2013_06_03_sdnmlb_lanmlb_1&mode=recap_home&c_id=la.
3
Andrew Simon, Puig Naps NL Player, Rookie Awards for June, THE
OFFICIAL SITE OF THE LOS ANGELES DODGERS (July. 3, 2013), http://m.dodgers.mlb.com/news/article/52580416/dodgers-outfielder-yasiel-puig-nl-player-ofthe-month-nl-rookie-of-the-month.
4
Historic Win for Cuban Jose Fernandez, BASEBALL WRITERS’
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, http://bbwaa.com/13-nl-roy/ (last visited Feb. 17,
2015).
5
Jesse Katz, Escape from Cuba: Yasiel Puig’s Untold Journey to the Dodgers, LOS ANGELES MAGAZINE (Apr. 14, 2014), http://www.lamag.com/longform/escape-from-cuba-yasiel-puigs-untold-journey-to-the-dodgers/2/.
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Katz of Los Angeles Magazine6 and Scott Eden of ESPN The Magazine7—unearthed Puig’s surreptitious journey.
The story began just before sunrise on a day in late April 2012.8
After four foiled attempts, Puig, just twenty-one at the time, set out
on his fifth attempt to escape Cuba.9 Along with his close friend, his
girlfriend, and a padrino (Puig’s Santerian spirit guide), Puig scaled
some of the most isolated stretches of land in the world along the
Cuban coast, accessible only by foot.10 Evading heavily armed Cuban police on numerous occasions over the course of thirty-hours,
the group met their smugglers on a remote dock. The smugglers took
the group to Isla Mujeres, an island east of Cancun, where the Puig
crew was held in the equivalent of a low-security prison, waiting for
an American contact to post their smuggling fee. One night, however, a rival crew arranged for the crew’s kidnapping by bribing El
Comando de Cancun, the Cancun police. The new Puig smugglers
arranged for the group to establish residency in Cancun, only after
bribing Cancun officials, of course. After a tryout in front of numerous MLB teams, Puig agreed to the seven-year pledge with the
Dodgers.
While players from countries such as the Dominican Republic
and Japan have made the transition to the MLB with relative ease,
sadly, these near-death stories, tales of failed attempts to flee, runins with Cuban police, kidnappings, briberies, forgeries, and money
laundering are common amongst those who have left Cuba to pursue
professional baseball careers.11 Dangerous journeys, similar to
6

Id.
Scott Eden, No One Walks Off The Island, ESPN (Apr. 17, 2014),
http://espn.go.com/espn/feature/story/_/id/10781144/no-one-walks-island-losangeles-dodgers-yasiel-puig-journey-cuba#section-3 [hereinafter Eden].
8
Id.
9
Steve Dilbeck, Yasiel Puig’s Incredible Journey From Cuba to U.S. Told
by LA Magazine, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Apr. 14, 2014, 7:03 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/sports/dodgers/dodgersnow/la-sp-dn-dodgers-yasielpuig-journey-20140413-story.html#ixzz2z60I2kfv [hereinafter Dilbeck].
10
Eden, supra note 7.
11
See Murray Chass, What’s $32 Million More? Yanks Sign Contreras, NEW
YORK TIMES (Dec. 25, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/25/sports/baseball-what-s-32-million-more-yanks-sign-contreras.html; Jordan Ritter Conn,
From Cuba With Heat, GRANTLAND (July 16, 2013), http://grantland.com/features/marlins-rookie-pitcher-jose-fernandez-journey-cuban-defector-mlb-allstar/; Susan Slusser and Demian Bulwa, The Céspedes Saga, SAN FRANCISCO
7
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Puig’s, have allowed numerous Cubans to sign large contracts with
MLB teams, thereby incentivizing smugglers to “cash-in.”12 Smugglers often promise freedom in exchange for a stake in the contracts
made by prospective Major Leaguers.13 Take Puig, for example,
who was forced to pay several of the financiers of his escape at least
$2 million.14 You may be wondering: Why must Cuban baseball
players risk their lives, their well being, and large portions of their
eventual salary to make it to the MLB? The answer to this question
is simple—current MLB rules fueled by the United States’s Cuban
embargo prevent MLB teams from negotiating directly with Cuban
prospects.15 Instead, a loophole in the league’s collective bargaining
agreement allows these players to negotiate with teams once they
have established residency in a foreign country. Although Cubans
may choose an alternative route—entering the Rule 4 Draft directly
from Cuba—these players are significantly limited in terms of their
choice of team as well as the amount of money in their eventual
contract. However, given the dual announcement by President
Barack Obama and Cuban leader Raúl Castro—that the two countries plan to restore diplomatic relations—the future of Cuban baseball players in Major League Baseball may pave the way for future
change.16
This note explores the past, present, and future of the path for
Cuban baseball players into MLB. Specifically, this note will explore the late-2014 agreement between the United States and Cuba
to normalize relations and its anticipated impact on MLB. Part I will
GATE (July 31, 2014, 10:15 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/athletics/article/The-Cspedes-saga-4665271.php.
12
Katz, supra note 5.
13
Jeff Passan, Charles Robinson & Rand Getlin, Leonys Martin Lawsuit Details Allegations of Cuban Baseball Player Smuggling, YAHOO! SPORTS (Dec. 6,
2013, 1:17 AM), http://sports.yahoo.com/news/leonys-martin-lawsuit-details-allegations-of-cuban-baseball-player-smuggling-061730936.html [hereinafter Passan, Robinson, & Getlin].
14
Eden, supra note 7.
15
Wendy Thurm, Trafficking in Cuban Ballplayers: A Look at Florida’s New
Law, FANGRAPHS (June 25, 2014), http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/traffickingcuban-ballplayers-florida-legislature-governor/.
16
Linda Robertson, What Will Become of Baseball’s Decline in Cuba? The
Field Might Open Further in U.S., MIAMI HERALD (Dec. 28, 2014, 2:56 PM),
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article5078058.html.
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explore the historical context of the relationship between the two
countries with a focus on the effect baseball has had on the relationship. Part II will draw attention to MLB’s current policies and the
turmoil Cuban baseball players must go through to make it to the
big leagues. Part III will concentrate on the issues that are occurring
on a regular basis because of the circuitous emigration process for
Cuban baseball players to make MLB. Part IV will explore the normalization of diplomatic relations agreement between the United
States and Cuba. Finally, Part V will explore a possible framework
to enhance the safety involved with the emigration process and efficiency of the troubling emigration issue while utilizing the normalized relations platform to align incentives.
I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT: IMPACT OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION AND
TRADE EMBARGO
The current MLB system for attracting and signing players that
hail from Cuba is deeply rooted in the social and political diplomatic
relationship between the governments of Cuba and the United
States.17 Prior to the Cuban Revolution of 1959, baseball served as
a common interest that bound the two countries socially. Following
the Revolution, however, United States policy encouraged a system
of isolation and restriction. This section reviews the historical context of the Cuba-United States relationship as it is reflected through
the game of baseball.
A. The Cuba-United States Baseball Relationship Prior to
1959
Notwithstanding the turbulent relationship between the United
States and Cuba that exists today, baseball actually served as a common bond between the United and Cuba for almost a century preceding the Cuban Revolution of 1959.18 The creation of the game of
Matthew Frankel, Major League Problems: Baseball’s Broken System of
Cuban Defection, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 383, 387 (2005) [hereinafter
Frankel].
18
Rachel D. Solomon, Cuban Baseball Players, the Unlucky Ones: United
States-Cuban Professional Baseball Relations Should be an Integral Part of the
United States-Cuba Relationship, 10 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 143, 156 (2011) [hereinafter Solomon].
17
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baseball dates back to the 1840s in a neighborhood just outside of
New York City.19 The game reached Cuba shortly thereafter.20 In
Cuba, sailors from the United States and Cubans returning from
American universities popularized the game and sparked interest
throughout the country.21 Two Cuban port cities, Havana and Matanzas, quickly “became hotbeds for the new sport.”22 The two cities
faced off against one another in the first officially recorded Cuban
baseball game in December of 1874.23 The formation of Cuban professional and amateur leagues quickly followed.24
Following its popularization and rapid exposure, baseball served
as a “cultural bridge between Cuba and the United States, with ballplayers constantly in transit from one country to the other.”25 From
the 1870s until the Cuban Revolution of 1959, Cuban and American
baseball players traveled freely between the two nations.26 Cuban
stars moved to the United States to participate at “all levels of American professional baseball,” including MLB.27 During the winters of
MLB’s offseason, MLB teams sent their younger players to participate in Cuba’s professional leagues as an opportunity to improve
their skills for the upcoming MLB season.28 Some MLB teams established spring training facilities in Cuba.29 Others traveled to Cuba
to square off in exhibition games against some of the world’s top
international talent. Cuba served as the “leading source of LatinAmerican baseball talent.”30 From 1954 to 1960, Havana served as
the home to a minor league baseball team, the Havana Sugar Kings,
19

Id.
Frankel, supra note 17, at 387; ROBERTO GONZÁLEZ ECHEVARRÍA, THE
PRIDE OF HAVANA: A HISTORY OF CUBAN BASEBALL 90 (1999) (explaining that
a man named Nemesio Guilló brought the first bat and ball to Cuba in 1864 after
going to school at a college in Mobile, Alabama) [hereinafter ECHEVARRÍA].
21
Frankel, supra note 17, at 387–88; ECHEVARRÍA, supra note 20, at 83–90.
22
Frankel, supra note 17, at 387–88; ECHEVARRÍA, supra note 20, at 82–83.
23
Frankel, supra note 17, at 388; ECHEVARRÍA, supra note 20, at 86.
24
Katherine E. Baird, Cuban Baseball: Ideology, Politics, and Market
Forces, 29 J. SPORT & SOC. ISSUES 164, 166 (2005) [hereinafter Baird].
25
Frankel, supra note 17, at 388; Solomon, supra note 18 at 156.
26
Solomon, supra note 18, at 156.
27
Frankel, supra note 17, at 388; MILTON H. JAMAIL, FULL COUNT: INSIDE
CUBAN BASEBALL 77 (2000).
28
Frankel, supra note 17, at 388–89.
29
Baird, supra note 24, at 166; Frankel, supra note 17, at 389.
30
Solomon, supra note 18, at 156.
20
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which was affiliated with the Cincinnati Redlegs (known today as
the Cincinnati Reds) and played in the Class AAA International
League.31 The baseball relationship between Cuba and the United
States became so strong that several prominent Cubans held preliminary discussions for a MLB team to be based out of Cuba.32
B. Baseball as a Form of Cuban National Identity
At the time, Cuba was under Spanish rule.33 Throughout the
1850s and 1860s, Cuban planters and other wealthy natives demanded social and economic change.34 In October of 1868, demands
for independence culminated in a Cuban uprising.35 This uprising
sparked the Guerra de los Diez Años or the Ten Years’ War, the first
Cuban War of Independence.36 In 1869, the War prompted Spanish
authorities to ban the game of baseball in Cuba.37 In response, Cuban baseball emerged as a rejection of Spanish hegemony.38 Cuban
baseball became symbolic of social change and independence.39 Cubans used baseball to establish a national identity that was distinct
from Spain and as a symbol of their national pride.40 Thus, since its
popularization in the late 1800s, “baseball has been considered “part
of the nacionalidad cubana [Cuban national identity].”41

31
Michael S. Schmidt, Opening of Relations Could Bring Cuban Stars to
Major League Baseball, NEW YORK TIMES (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/18/sports/baseball/for-baseball-cuba-is-front-and-center.html.
32
Solomon, supra note 18, at 156; see also Baird, supra note 24, at 166.
33
LOUIS A. PEREZ, JR., CUBA: BETWEEN REFORM AND REVOLUTION 80-89
(Rafael Hernandez and John H. Coatsworth, eds., Oxford University Press, 3rd
ed., 2005).
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
See generally ECHEVARRÍA, supra note 20.
38
Id.
39
Ibsen Martinez, Latin Baseball: A Frontier Story, LIBRARY OF ECONOMICS
LIBERTY
(Jan.
9,
2006),
http://www.econlib.org/library/ColAND
umns/y2006/Martinezbaseball.html.
40
Id.
41
Frankel, supra note 17, at 388.
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C. The Cuban Revolution of 1959 and Banning of Professional
Baseball in Cuba
The start of the Cuban Revolution of 1959 ended the “symbiotic
relationship” between Cuban and American baseball.42 Guerilla
leader Fidel Castro led the overthrow of Fulgencio Batista’s authoritarian government and established Cuba as a socialist state with a
Communist government.43 As leader, Castro employed wide-ranging changes to the nation’s baseball program to emphasize the government’s socialist values.44 In 1961, Castro abolished professional
baseball in favor of a strictly amateur baseball system.45 The new
system was “centered on a socialist paradigm of amateur sports motivated by national ideals rather than money.”46 Officials of the Revolution believed that the profit motive under a capitalist system corrupted the sport. The Cuban government established success in baseball as a primary goal of the Communist government, as a means of
legitimizing and drawing positive attention to the Cuban Revolution.47 In line with communist ideals, players in the Cuban leagues
received a salary from the government that was “comparable to the
earnings of the majority of the labor force.”48
D. The Response of the United States: The Cuban Embargo
In the wake of the Cuban Revolution and Cuba’s establishment
of a Communist government, the United States responded by enacting an embargo against Cuba and severing diplomatic ties with the
nation. The United States government implemented the Cuban embargo in 1963 based in part upon the Trading With the Enemy Act
(“TWEA”), originally passed in 1917 during World War I.49 The
Solomon, supra note 18, at 156.
Guy Raz and Jason Beaubien, Cuba Marks 50 Years Since ‘Triumphant
Revolution,
National
Public
Radio
(Jan.
1,
2009,
4:00PM),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=98937598.
44
ECHEVARRÍA, supra note 20, at 355; Frankel, supra note 17, at 390.
45
Frankel, supra note 17, at 390
46
Solomon, supra note 18, at 156–57.
47
Paula Pettavino & Philip Brenner, “The Role of Sports in Cuba’s Domestic
and International Policy.” Cuba Briefing Paper, 21(4), 2.
48
Solomon, supra note 18, at 157.
49
Matthew Poehl, Double Play: How Major League Baseball Can Fix the
Amateur Draft and International Player Acquisition with One Swing, 8
WILLAMETTE SPORTS L.J. 17 (Fall 2010).
42
43
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TWEA bans “transfers of property between United States citizens
and enemy nations, unless authorized by the President.”50 The President may exercise the powers conferred by the TWEA in times of
war as well as in peacetime to “enable the President to engage in
extensive regulation of international economic transactions when a
national emergency so required.”51 Section 5(b) of the TWEA, in
pertinent part, allows the President of the United States to:
investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify,
void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition holding,
withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or
exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect
to, or transaction involving, any property in which
any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest by any person, or with respect to any property,
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.52
In 1963, based on the President’s TWEA powers, the Kennedy
Administration passed the Cuba Assets Control Regulations
(“CACR”).53 The regulations provide the “basic governing rules for
of the Cuban embargo.”54 The CACR prohibits “‘transactions incident to travel to, from, and within Cuba’ as well as any ‘payment or
transfer’ to any Cuban national.”55
The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 (“CDA”)56 and the Cuban
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996,57 also known as the
Helms-Burton Act, further expanded impact of the embargo and restrictions of the CACR. The CDA strengthened the embargo sanctions to include a “ban on conducting business in Cuba to U.S.Solomon, supra note 18, at 169.
Solomon, supra note 18, at 168 (quoting Cornet Stores v. Morton, 632 F.2d
96, 97 (9th Cir. 1990)).
52
50 U.S.C.A. § 5(b)(1)(B) (2006).
53
Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.101–901 (2009); see
also Solomon, supra note 18, at 169.
54
Frankel, supra note 17, at 393 (citing 22 U.S.C. § 6032(c)).
55
Frankel, supra note 17, at 393 (citing 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.305, 515.309(a),
515.415(a)(1)).
56
Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001–6024 (2009).
57
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, 31 C.F.R. § 515
(1999) [hereinafter Helms-Burton Act].
50
51

SUMMER 2016]

NORMALIZED RELATIONS AND MLB INFLUENCE

269

owned or controlled business located overseas.”58 The stated purpose of the CDA was to maintain the embargo and sanctions against
Cuba “so long as the Cuban government refused to move toward
democratization and greater respect for human rights.”59 The
Helms-Burton Act aims to “globalize the current U.S. trade embargo . . . by discouraging third-party countries and their nationals
from dealing or investing in Cuba.”60 Similar to the CDA, the
Helms-Burton Act places sanctions on the nation in order to encourage Cuba to adopt a democratically elected government and to improve overall conditions in the country.61
E. Cuban Escapees: Why Do They Leave?
In Cuba, Castro’s Communist government “fashions national
heroes out of its star ballplayers.”62 Despite the glorified hero status
in their homeland, some Cuban players have sought to take their talents to the United States.63 However, some Cubans view the escapees as traitors, and their escape “implies a rejection of patria, or
homeland.”64 This decision to leave is often a difficult one, as Cuban
players that choose to leave are “given the label traidores al béisbol,
or ‘baseball traitors,’ by the [Cuban] government.”65 Aspiring baseball players “must leave [their] homeland forever . . . relinquish[ing]
their basic human right to return home.”66 The government treats the
players as if they “no longer exist, never mentioning them again in
the state-controlled press.”67 In the official record books, an asterisk
is left next to the names of these players that reads abandonó el país,
meaning “left the country.”68 Some scholars attribute this desire to
leave to the superior level of talent in the United States.69 Others
Solomon, supra note 18, at 170; see CDA, supra note 56 at § 6005.
Solomon, supra note 18, at 170.
60
Id.
61
Helms-Burton Act, supra note 57, at §301.
62
Solomon, supra note 18, at 154 (quoting Frankel, supra note 17, at 391).
63
Id.
64
Frankel, supra note 17, at 401.
65
Solomon, supra note 18, at 154 (citing Frankel, supra note 17, at 402).
66
Frankel, supra note 17, at 402.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Michael Powell, For Cuban Players, No Embargo on Dreams, NEW YORK
TIMES (Dec. 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/24/sports/baseball/in58
59
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stress that Cubans prefer to play in the MLB “mainly because of the
large contracts.”70 Whereas baseball players in Cuba are paid small
stipends by the government, escaping to the United States could entitle the players to a big payday.71 The average Cuban baseball
player makes forty-dollars per month.72 Although this is twice as
much as the average Cuban, the average MLB salary in 2013 was
almost $3.4 million, which equates to approximately $283,000 per
month.73 The disparity in potential salary, coupled with the poor
conditions in Cuba, creates a large incentive to escape, even at the
expense of being branded disloyal to Cuba and being put through
dangerous and traumatic experiences.
F. Cuba-United States Baseball Relationship Today
The Cuban trade embargo and the resulting economic and political sanctions have had a significant impact on Cuban baseball players who seek to play professionally in the United States. The embargo effectively “prohibit[s] MLB organizations from conducting
any business in Cuba, such as scouting or signing players.”74 Because a Cuban national may not enter the MLB directly, players
seeking to play in the MLB must escape from Cuba and renounce
their Cuban citizenship.75 This requirement leaves one of two routes
to professional baseball in the United States: (1) attempt to enter the
United States by seeking asylum or (2) escape to another country.76
Following the Cuban Revolution, it took nearly thirty-years for
a player to challenge Cuba’s new, amateur-only system.77 On July
10, 1991, while visiting the United States as a member of the Cuban
National baseball team, a pitcher named Rene Arocha “found an exit
cuba-no-embargo-on-hope-as-baseball-players-say-take-me-to-america.html?_r=0 [hereinafter Powell].
70
Solomon, supra note 18, at 154 (citing Frankel, supra note 17, at 402).
71
Jonathan Watts, Cuba’s Baseball Players Have Ceilings On Their Salaries
Lifted and Can Play Abroad, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 18, 2013, 6:49 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/18/cuba-baseball-players-pay-rise.
72
Powell, supra note 69.
73
MLBPA Info, THE OFFICIAL SITE OF MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL,
http://mlb.mlb.com/pa/info/faq.jsp#average (last visited Feb. 17, 2015).
74
Frankel, supra note 17, at 394
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Id.
76
See infra Part II on MLB rules and options for players.
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Frankel, supra note 17, at 383.
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sign” at Miami International Airport and became the first Cuban to
leave the country in order to play professionally in the United
States.78 By leaving, Arocha “single-handedly ended Castro’s monopoly on Cuban baseball talent and catalyzed a revolution on both
sides of the Straits of Florida.”79 Since his escape, nearly 160 players
have followed Arocha’s lead.80 As of the end of the 2014 season,
there were twenty-four Cubans on MLB rosters.81
In 1999, in conjunction with then-President Bill Clinton’s efforts
to ease the Cuban trade embargo and improve relations with the island nation, the Baltimore Orioles participated in a “home and
home” series against the Cuban National Baseball team—the Orioles traveled to Cuba for several games in March, and the Cuban
National Team returned the favor by playing the Orioles in Baltimore that May.82 The organization of the series required the State
Department to negotiate terms with the Castro government—profits
from the game in Baltimore could not be sent to the Cuban government due to the embargo.83 Despite accusations that the game was
being used as an avenue to illegally scout Cuban players, the series
was a significant step in the right direction toward improving the
baseball relationship between Cuba and the United States.84
On the eve of the March 1999 game in Havana, Fidel Castro
hosted several of Major League Baseball’s senior executives, including baseball’s commissioner Bud Selig, for dinner at his Presidential palace.85 As the dinner crept into the early hours of the morning, Castro “regaled Selig with tales of Cuban baseball and fantasized about what would happen if the United States and Cuba normalized diplomatic and economic ties.”86 Throughout the discus-
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Id.
Id.
80
List of Cuban Defectors, BASEBALL REFERENCE, http://www.baseball-reference.com/bullpen/List_of_Cuban_Defectors (last visited Feb. 17, 2014).
81
Id.
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Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Baseball Diplomacy, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV.
473, 474–75 (2001).
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Id. at 474.
84
Id.
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Schmidt, supra note 31.
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sion, Castro announced that his nation was “open to the idea of major league teams having academies in Cuba.”87 Despite progress in
these talks of having an active baseball relationship with Cuba, the
discussions served as nothing but a distant dream.88
In recent years, numerous Cubans, including Puig, have become
stars in the MLB after signing lucrative contracts with MLB franchises.89 Puig himself signed a seven-year, $42 million deal and was
an all-star in 2014.90 In the summer of 2013, first baseman Jose
Abreu left Cuba and signed a six-year deal worth $68 million.91 In
his first season, Abreu was an all-star and won the American League
Rookie of the Year and Silver Slugger awards.92 Aroldis Chapman,
who escaped in 2009, has represented the National League in three
straight all-star games and is viewed as one of the best relief pitchers
in the game today.93
Some commentators argue that the market for Cuban baseball
players has gotten out-of-hand, based on the potential to strike gold
like the Dodgers with Puig or the White Sox with Abreu.94 In August
2014, the Boston Red Sox signed outfielder Rusney Castillo to a
seven-year, $72.5 million contract, the richest deal ever for a Cuban.95 Castillo had not played competitively in over a year.96 Despite
his enormous potential, scouts questioned his defensive skills and
whether his “long swing” would translate into success against
87

Id.
Id.
89
Jonah Keri, The Evolution of the Cuban Baseball Pipeline, GRANTLAND
(June 18, 2014), http://grantland.com/the-triangle/the-evolution-of-the-cubanbaseball-pipeline/.
90
Sanchez, supra note 1.
91
Jesse Sanchez, Abreu Smashing in First Major League Season, THE
OFFICIAL SITE OF MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL (Dec. 30, 2014),
http://m.mlb.com/news/article/105121618/white-sox-slugger-jose-abreu-issmashing-in-first-mlb-season.
92
Id.
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Jayson Stark, The Mind-Blowing Stats of Aroldis Chapman, ESPN (Sept.
9, 2014), http://espn.go.com/blog/jayson-stark/post/_/id/890/the-mind-blowingstats-of-aroldis-chapman.
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Powell, supra note 69.
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R.J. Anderson, Transaction Analysis, BASEBALL PROSPECTUS (Aug. 22,
2014),
http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=24491&mode=print&nocache=1455720643.
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harder-throwing major league pitchers.97 Similarly, in November
2014, the Arizona Diamondbacks signed 24-year-old outfielder
Yasmany Tomas to a six-year pledge worth $68.5 million, despite
concerns over his ability to stay in shape and remain in the outfield
at the major league level.98 Tomas was coming off of a down year
in which he was injured.99
In addition to the success and large contracts, each of these players share another common storyline with Puig: their treacherous
path to the United States. Hidden behind the million-dollar curtains
and awards are their dangerous tales of human trafficking. Like
Puig’s story, other stories of smuggling, guns, bribes, and danger
have been slowly unveiled. These dangers can be attributed to current MLB policies that bar teams from speaking to, negotiating with,
and having any affiliation with Cuba and their nationals.
G. Cuba’s Loan System: the First Step Toward an Open
Market?
After years of public denouncement towards players who escape
the country to pursue professional baseball opportunities overseas,
the Cuba Serie Nacional instituted an overhauled domestic league
system in September 2013.100 Although Cubans, ranging from Castro to representatives of the Cuban Serie Nacional, maintained a
harsh stance against Cuban players that leave the island, the league
created a process that allows Cuban players to travel to a overseas
professional leagues in Mexico and Japan.101 Some baseball scholars predicted this new system would provide the first step towards
Kurt Mensching, Rusney Castillo Questions Answered, SB NATION (Aug.
18, 2014), http://www.sbnation.com/mlb/2014/8/18/6031123/rusney-castillofree-agent-faq-cuba-yankees-red-sox-tigers-phillies.
98
Jerry Crasnick, The Word on Yasmany Tomas? Power!, ESPN (Nov. 27,
2014), http://espn.go.com/mlb/story/_/id/11937668/mlb-yasmany-tomas-nextline-cuban-stars-mlb.
99
Grant Brisbee, MLB Free Agent Prediction: Yasmany Tomas, SB NATION
(Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.sbnation.com/mlb/2014/11/20/7255123/yasmanytomas-rumors-free-agent-prediction-unless-they-should-be-yasmani-tomas-rumors.
100
Peter C. Bjarkman, U.S.-Cuba Thaw Is Not So Hot for MLB, THE DAILY
BEAST (Feb. 19, 2015), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/02/19/u-scuba-thaw-is-not-so-hot-for-mlb.html.
101
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an open Cuban baseball market.102 The reality of this new system,
however, is that the change in policy reflects little more than a financial opportunity for the Cuban league and Cuban teams to revive
their dilapidated stadiums and outdated equipment.103 Further, a
scandal during the system’s first year further complicated the already controversial human trafficking concerns involved with leaving the island.104
Cuba’s new system allowing for players to pursue overseas opportunities hinges on two distinct contingencies: players may perform overseas so long as (1) the player is to “remain property of the
government-controlled baseball enterprise,” and (2) the player may
play only during the Cuban offseason in the summer months and
must return to their respective Cuban team once the Cuban season
begins in the winter.105 Essentially, the Cuban league agrees to a
loan agreement with the Mexican League and the Nippon Professional Baseball League in Japan.106 Because the Cuban Government
operates the Serie Nacional, anywhere from as low as 10% to as high
as 75% of the player’s overseas salary is paid directly to the Cuban
sports arm of the Cuban government.107 Players do not negotiate
their own overseas deals—league officials do.108 Additionally, players must be available at all times to participate in tournaments with
the national team.109 Although the new system does allow for players to travel, the heavy restrictions focus on keeping the players in
Cuba for the long run.110 For some, it is seen as a “perk for longterm loyalty,” rather than a shift towards encouraging players to
seek overseas contracts.111 Due to the lack of freedom, players are
102
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Id.
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Enrique Rojas, OF in Mexico With False Passport, ESPN DEPORTES (May
15, 2014, 8:23 AM), http://espn.go.com/mlb/story/_/id/10927805/top-cuban-alfredo-despaigne-mexico-false-passport [hereinafter Rojas].
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Bjarkman, supra note 100.
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Cuban Baseball?, USA TODAY SPORTS (Feb. 4, 2015, 11:15 PM),
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simply political chess pieces in the government-controlled baseball
enterprise. The players serve as little more than a way for the Cuban
sports federation to increase its revenue. The new system signals little, if any, change in the Cuban stance towards players leaving the
country.
Additionally, the new Cuban system has become riddled with
problems and controversy in its short lifetime.112 Alfredo Despaigne, a three-time MVP in Serie Nacional and one of the Cuban
League’s biggest stars, became the first player to “sign” with an
overseas team when he was assigned to the Mexican League Campeche club.113 Despaigne, along with several other Cubans, participated in the Mexican League during the 2013 season and returned
to the island with relatively few problems.114 However, before the
start of the 2014 Mexican League season, Major League Baseball
(with whom the Mexican League has a professional affiliation) advised Mexican League officials that the league must require a passport from a third country before employing Cuban players, due to
concerns involving the United States’s embargo against Cuba.115 In
May of 2014, after the Mexican League’s season was underway,
ESPN Deportes reporter Enrique Rojas revealed that Despaigne was
playing in the Mexican League using a falsified passport from the
Dominican Republic.116 Despaigne had no family in the Domincan
Republic.117 He had never visited the island.118 Shortly thereafter,
the Mexican League served Despaigne a lifetime ban and he returned to Cuba.119 After the controversy surrounding Despaigne, the
Cuban League shifted its focus to loaning players to the Nippon Professional Baseball League in Japan.120 Although the stints in Japan

See Rojas, supra note 104.
Ben Badler, Why is Cuban Outfielder Alfredo Despaigne Playing in Mexico Using a Dominican Passport?, BASEBALL AMERICA (May 13, 2014),
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have been successful thus far, the Cuban sports federation has chosen a mere four players, veterans Despaigne, Freddie Cepeda, Yulieski Gourriel, and highly-touted prospect Héctor Mendoza, to play in
Japan.121 Despite the potential for additional transfers, given the rich
talent on the island, the choice of players appears to be a strategic
one that balances the likelihood of the player remaining in Cuba and
the potential size of the contract the player will receive. Still, however, Cuba remains far from willing to open its doors completely,
especially to the United States.
II. CURRENT MLB POLICY: THE PATH TO THE SHOW
MLB subjects Cuban players to a unique system of rules when
compared to players from other foreign countries.122 Current rules
force Cubans to escape the island to play professionally in the
United States.123 Thus, Cubans have three options: (1) regardless of
age and accrued playing time, obtain political asylum by escaping
to the United States, Canada, or Puerto Rico, subjecting the player
to the Rule 4 amateur draft; (2) prior to the age of twenty three or
before playing five professional seasons in Cuba, escape to another
country, subjecting the player to international amateur free agency
rules/limitations; or (3) after turning twenty three and accruing five
years of professional baseball in Cuba, escape to another country,
subjecting the player to regular free agency rules. The timing and
destination of their escape have a significant impact on their free
agency in terms of their total contract as well as their freedom to
sign with a team of their choice.124
A. The Kuhn Directive
In 1977, then-MLB Commissioner Bowie Kuhn inaugurated the
“Kuhn Directive,” Major League Baseball’s rules concerning Cuban
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players.125 The rules prohibit the “discussion or negotiation with anyone in Cuba regarding the signing of any player in Cuba.”126 Additionally, this forbids any MLB or team representative from scouting Cuban players, so long as the player remains on the island.127
However, the directive does not expressly prohibit scouting players
when they are not on the island.128 Because MLB teams may not
sign players that are residents of Cuba (a restriction that is unique
amongst other nations), teams must wait for the players to leave the
country.129 Consequently, in the event that players seek to join a
MLB team, they must escape and establish residency in either the
United States or another foreign country.130
In time, however, players began to find creative ways to enter
the MLB, which turned out to be a much more lucrative career, but
also riskier. Cubans seeking to play in the MLB first established residency in a third country and then entered the United States on an
“O” or “P” visa.131
By doing so, the players avoid the draft provisions of Rule 4 and
are free to negotiate salaries with all MLB teams instead of having
to wait a year to establish residency and enter the Draft.132 In other
words, the Cuban player must abide by the Cuban Adjustment Act
(“wet foot, dry foot” American policy), which generally allows Cuban nationals to stay in America if they are caught on American soil
Solomon, supra note 18, at 159; Frankel, supra note 17, at 397.
Solomon, supra note 18, at 159; Frankel, supra note 17, at 397.
127
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Pitchers Yearning for Strike Three: How Baseball Diplomacy can Revitalize Major League Baseball and United States-Cuba Relations, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV.
1647, 1657-59 (1999) (describing the “O” visa category as a two-step process
where a baseball team must first contract with a foreign player and file a petition
with one of the four regional Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”)
Centers that possess jurisdiction in the area where the foreign baseball player will
compete. Second, approval of these “O” visa petitions requires consultation with
a peer group in the player’s field. Thus, the “O” visa subcategories provide avenues for an extraordinary foreign baseball player, as well as his coach and immediate family members, to reach the United States.) [hereinafter Greller].
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L. REV. 473, 480 (2001).
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(dry foot) but face possible repatriation to Cuba if they are caught at
sea (wet foot).133 In many cases, players prefer to seek asylum in the
United States in compliance with the “wet-foot, dry-foot” rule after
moving to another country like Mexico or Haiti first, which are safer
to get to from Cuba.134
B. Major League Baseball Eligibility Requirements
Rule 3 of the Major League Baseball Rules describe the eligibility requirements for MLB teams to acquire players. Rule
3(a)(1)(A)–(B), in pertinent part, provides the following:
(a) ELIGIBILITY TO SIGN MAJOR LEAGUE OR
MINOR LEAGUE CONTRACTS
(1) General Rules . . . A Major or Minor League Club
may contract with a player under the conditions and
restrictions set forth in this Rule 3. A player may be
subject to one or more of the following Rules and
may contract with a Major a Major or Minor League
Club only if the conditions and restrictions of all
Rules applicable to the player are satisfied. It is the
responsibility of the contracting Club to determine
that a player is eligible to sign in accordance with this
Rule 3. For purposes of this Rule 3, the term “United
States” shall mean the 50 States of the United States
of America, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico,
and any other Commonwealth, Territory or Possession of the United States of America.
(A) A player who has not previously contracted
with a Major or Minor League Club, and who is
a resident of the United States or Canada, may be
signed to a contract only after having been eligible for selection in the First- Year Player draft. A
player shall be considered a “resident of the
Frankel, supra note 17, at 394-95.
Jeff Passan, 10 Degrees: Cuban Trafficking Grows into MLB’s Ugly Secret, YAHOO! SPORTS (Apr. 20, 2014, 11:47 PM), http://sports.yahoo.com/news/10-degrees--cuban-trafficking-grows-into-mlb-s-ugly-secret034704407.html [hereinafter Passan].
133
134
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United States” if the player enrolls in a United
States high school or college or establishes a legal residence in the United States on the date of
the player’s contract or within one year prior to
that date . . . .
(B) A player who has not previously contracted
with a Major or Minor League Club, who is not a
resident of the United States or Canada, and who
is not subject to the High School, College or Junior College Rules, may be signed to a contract if
the player:
(i) is at least 17 years old at the time of signing,
or
(ii) is 16 at the time of signing, but will attain age
17 prior to either the end of the effective season
for which the player has signed or September 1
of such effective season, whichever is later.135
Although seemingly a Cuban national qualifies as an international player under Rule 3(a)(1)(B) (a player from Cuba is “not a
resident of the United States or Canada”), the Kuhn Directive prohibits such a determination.136 Instead, to be eligible to play in the
MLB, the Cuban player must escape Cuba to sign a contract with a
Major League organization.137 To fall under Category A, the Cuban
player must immigrate to the United States, Puerto Rico, or Canada
and establish legal residency.138 Alternatively, to fall under Category B as an international player, the Cuban must establish residency in another country that is not Cuba.139 The decision to seek

Major League Baseball, The Official Professional Baseball Rules Book, R.
3, OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER (NY 2014), available at http://www.bizofbaseball.com/docs/MajorLeagueRules-2008.pdf [hereinafter Major League Baseball].
136
Id. at R. 3(a)(1)(B); see Solomon, supra note 18, at 159.
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qualification under Category A or Category B has a significant impact on the player’s future career, both in terms of money as well as
choice of team.140
C. Routes to the MLB
1. Rule 4 First-Year Player Draft
Players who fall under Category A (meaning they are legal residents of the United States, a United States territory, or Canada and
have completed either high school, two years of Junior College, or
at least three years at a standard college) are required to enter the
First-Year Player Draft (“Rule 4 Draft”).141 Rule 4 of the Major
League Baseball Rules governs the First-Year Player Draft.142 Rule
4(b) dictates that in June of each year, MLB shall a selection meeting for Category A players.143 The Rule 4 draft consists of fifty selection rounds, where each team generally has the right to select one
player per round.144 The draft order is determined by the previous
season’s standings, with the first pick awarded to the team with the
worst record.145 Additionally, teams that lost free agents in the previous season may be awarded “compensatory” selections.146
Selection of a player essentially provides a team with exclusive
contract negotiation rights with that individual player until July 15
of the draft year.147 Rule 3(c), in conjunction with Article VI of the
MLB Player’s Association Collective Bargaining Agreement
(“CBA”), dictates the base terms of first-year player contracts.148 In
other words, the MLB rules dictate the salaries for contracts signed
by players that have been drafted.149
See Solomon, supra note 18, at 160.
Major League Baseball, supra note 135, at R. 3(a)(1)(A).
142
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However, MLB teams do have some discretion as to the signing
bonus of the contract, terms that are separate from the salary itself.150
The complicated signing bonus rules are laid out in the CBA.151
Prior to the draft, the Commissioner’s Office allocates a “bonus
pool,” the total amount of money from which a team may draw and
offer to its drafted players for their initial contracts.152 The bonus
pool is based on the sum of the “slot-value” of a team’s first ten
picks, a recommended total for each draft pick’s signing bonus according to their draft position.153 Beyond the first ten rounds, any
signing bonus amount that surpasses $100,000 is subtracted from
the team’s bonus pool.154 Although there is not a hard cap on the
team’s bonus pool, teams face harsh tax penalties for spending an
amount greater than their bonus pool.155 Accordingly, each team has
the discretion to award signing bonuses that are greater than the individual slot value, as long as the team compensates for this amount
with the signing bonuses of its other draft picks.156
For aspiring Cubans, taking the Rule 4 Draft route by entering
the United States, a United States Territory, or Canada seems to be
the least attractive option. First, because they are forced to enter the
MLB draft, the Cuban player does not have the option of choosing
which team they would prefer to play for. Because the draft has a
specific selection order, each of the thirty MLB teams has the opportunity to draft the player. Second, because the MLB has such
strict rules for signing bonuses, a Cuban player’s total contract is
severely limited. While the higher draft picks tend to receive higher
bonuses, the amount of the signing bonus is still a fraction of what
the player might otherwise earn on the open free agency market.
Additionally, players do not know what number selection they will
be in the draft, much less whether or not they will be drafted at all.
If a Cuban player enters the annual draft and each team fails to draft
150
CBA, supra note 148 at Art. VI; Craig Goldstein, 2014 MLB Draft Rules
and Regulations, SB NATION (June 5, 2014, 8:02 AM), http://www.sbnation.com/mlb/2014/6/5/5781090/2014-mlb-draft-rules-regulations-guide-basics
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the player, the player is unable to attain free agency.157 With the least
amount of freedom, entering the Rule 4 Draft is the least beneficial
option for Cuban baseball players.
2. International Amateur Free Agency and Bonus Pools
International players that fall under Category B (meaning they
are over the age of seventeen and are not residents of the United
States, a United States territory, or Canada) are subject to International Amateur Free Agency rules dictated by the current CBA.158
The international signing period extends from July 2 through June
15 of the following season.159 Similar to the Rule 4 Draft, the MLB
Commissioners’ Office assigns a bonus pool to each team, the total
amount a team may spend on its international free agents.160 The
team with the worst winning percentage from the previous season
receives the largest pool.161 The bonus pool applies to all international free agent bonuses that are distributed in excess of $10,000.162
Also similar to the Rule 4 draft, the penalties for teams exceeding
their international bonus spending caps are extremely harsh.163
There is no selection order for international free agency and teams
are free to negotiate with individual players at their leisure.164
Leaving Cuba and immigrating to a country outside of the
United States, a United States territory, or Canada, and then taking
the International Amateur Free Agency route, is seemingly a more
attractive option for aspiring Cuban players. The important difference between international free agency and the Rule 4 Draft for Cubans is the ability to negotiate and choose teams freely.165 This allows Cuban players to create their own market (in terms of their
Solomon, supra note 18, at 160.
CBA, supra note 148, at Attachment 46.
159
MLB Int’l Signing Period Primer, supra note 124; Ben Badler, 2014-15
MLB International Bonus Pools and Slot Values, BASEBALL AMERICA (Apr. 2,
2014),
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signing bonus total) as well as choose which organization will best
suit their transition to the United States (in terms of the location of
the team).166 By placing teams in a bidding war for their services,
Cubans are able to take a market-based approach that best suits their
needs.167 However, like the Rule 4 Draft, the bonus pool limits each
player’s signing bonus amount.168 Even if teams were to allocate
their entire bonus pool to a single player, a star Cuban player is
likely to earn significantly more money in a completely open market.169 Nevertheless, when left with the choice of international free
agency or entering the Rule 4 Draft, it is virtually a no-brainer for
Cuban players to choose free agency, given the freedom to choose
one’s MLB organization.170
3. Exception to International Free Agency
Although most Cubans who leave to a country outside of the
United States, a United States territory, and Canada are subject to
the bonus pool limitations, an important exemption from the rule
exists for certain players.171 The bonus pools do not limit contracts
signed by Cubans that are (1) at least 23 years old, (2) have played
in a Cuban professional league for a least five seasons, and (3) have
left the island.172 Instead, Cubans seeking to play in the MLB that
meet this exception have unlimited negotiating power when it comes
to their total contracts and signing bonuses.173 These players are
treated equally with other free agents that have earned service time
playing in the MLB—they are free to choose any of the 30 MLB
organizations and the only limits on the contract totals for these
players are their respective owner’s pockets.174 The large contracts
that have made recent headlines, like those of Puig, Abreu, and
Chapman, each fit under this exception.175 With neither a restriction
166
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on team nor on salary, this is the most lucrative and popular option
for Cuban players.176
D. An Additional Hurdle: United States Treasury Office of
Foreign Assets Control
United States regulations require that Cubans seeking employment in the United States obtain authorization from the United
States Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control.177 Thus, Cuban
baseball players must obtain an “unblocked national” designation
from OFAC in order to sign with MLB teams.178 To designate an
individual as an unblocked national, the OFAC authorizes two types
of licenses—specific and general.179 A specific license is a formal
written document issued by OFAC.180 It requires that the applicant
submit a formal application including the documents indicating permanent residency described above.181 A general license, however, is
less formal— it is not a written document and does not require the
player to submit documents to OFAC.182 Instead, a player may submit such documents directly to his prospective employer.183
To receive the unblocked national designation from the OFAC,
a Cuban national has two options.184 For players that escape to the
United States, the Cuban player must take up residence in the United
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States and, at a minimum, submit an application to become a permanent resident.185 For Cuban players that escape to another foreign
country, the player must present at least two documents indicating
permanent residency from the foreign government to their prospective employer or to the Office through a formal application.186 Such
documents may include a “passport, voter registration card, permanent resident card, or national identity card.”187
Prior to 2012, MLB allowed teams to sign players from Cuba as
long as the player received either a general or specific license.188
Thus, players like Yasiel Puig were able to obtain the unblocked
national designation simply by presenting the required foreign government documents to the team seeking their services.189 This did
not require a formal, specific license, and players did not have to
submit documents directly to the OFAC.190 However, towards the
end of 2012, MLB sent a memo to all thirty teams detailing new,
stiffer requirements regarding the unblocked national designation.191 Today, teams may not sign a Cuban national until the OFAC
has issued a specific license to the player.192 This does not appear to
coincide with any change in US policy regarding the Cuban trade
embargo or immigration laws.193 Additionally, MLB has refused to
comment regarding these stiffer requirements on numerous occasions.194
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III: LITIGATION INVOLVED BASEBALL PLAYERS’, AGENTS’,
SMUGGLERS’ IN TROUBLE
On the other end of the spectrum, the people who aid in the
movement of Cuban baseball players are also causing lawsuits. Often, sports agents are known for an aggressive style of seeking out
talent and clients by any means necessary. So when a gold mine like
Cuba produces some of the top MLB talent in recent years, it is no
wonder that these sports agents are flocking to this market with
goals of cashing out on a few solid deals. Since the negotiations are
made more difficult due to Cuba’s embargo, this begs the question
of whether these sports agents are truly looking out for their client’s
safety, or whether they are just trying to be the first agent to make
contact with the players and earn a cut of these players’ huge contracts. Also, with regards to the human trafficking ring, sports agents
may have been unethical when they were scouting the Mexican
baseball academy, which was full of corrupt ordeals.
The most notorious example of this occurrence came in 2007
when Gus Dominguez, a sports agent, was found guilty of illegally
assisting five baseball players across the border of the United States
and was sentenced to five years in prison.195 South Florida attorney
Ben Daniel has handled dozens of smuggling cases which involve
extorting Cubans.196 Dominguez was charged with paying four aides
to transport the athletes and other Cubans to the United States from
Cuba.197 Attorney Daniel won the case in 2007 against Dominguez,
which led to a five-year jail sentence for Dominguez and a ban from
sports agency.198 With the normalized relations and the potential for
agents to travel on licensed terms to Cuba, many sports agents are
likely to flock into the country.
Darren Heitner, Gus Dominguez Out of Jail, Working with MLB Players,
AGENT
BLOG
(June
13,
2014),
http://sportsaSPORTS
gentblog.com/2011/06/13/gus-dominguez-out-of-jail-working-with-mlb-players/.
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On May 4, 2011, Cuban outfielder Leonys Martin signed a fiveyear major league contract with the Texas Rangers worth $15.5 million dollars, including a $5 million signing bonus.199 In reality, however, Martin would never see a large percent of his signing bonus
and salary.200 Whereas a typical MLB player can expect to lose out
on anywhere from three to five percent of their total earnings (fees
typically provided to their agents), Martin was to lose thirty-five
percent of his contract.201 However, the benefactor of this thirty-five
percent was not Martin’s agent—it was Eliezer Lazo, the man who
helped smuggle Martin out of Cuba.202
Details of Martin’s escape came to light in the form of a civil
lawsuit filed against him by the Estrellas del Beisbol baseball academy.203 The suit was a breach of contract claim, alleging that Martin
had agreed and failed to pay thirty-five percent of his MLB salary
to the academy’s operators, one of which was Lazo.204 In a countersuit, Martin alleged that the Estrellas academy was a “non-existent . . . entity that serves as a front for illegal activity, such as human
smuggling and trafficking, kidnapping and extortion.”205
According to the countersuit, Martin decided to leave with several family members around August 2010 through a connection in
Miami.206 When Martin was unable to find the boat scheduled to
pick up the group, Lazo’s cousin, Jesus Toledo, approached him.207
Toledo promised he could sneak Martin and his group into Mexico.208 Upon boarding a 45-foot yacht headed to Cancun, Lazo was
waiting to introduce himself.209 Lazo demanded $2.5 million from
Richard Durrett, Rangers Sign Leonys Martin, ESPN DALLAS (May 4,
2011, 3:44 PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/dallas/mlb/news/story?id=6478110.
200
Passan, Robinson, & Getlin, supra note 13.
201
Id.
202
Id.
203
Jay Weaver, Feds Charge Trio With Kidnapping, Extorting Cuban Ballplayer with Texas Rangers, MIAMI HERALD (Dec. 4, 2014, 5:33 PM),
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Martin’s Miami connection.210 Soon thereafter, Martin and three
other baseball players were sent to a training facility in Monterrey.211 It was at the facility that Martin allegedly signed an agreement with Martin, where the academy agreed to provide “training,
housing and sports clothing . . . [i]n exchange . . . [for] 35 percent of
any future professional baseball contract.”212 Although they were
apparently there to “train,” the facility had neither baseball equipment nor a baseball field.213 Martin was consistently under armed
watch. At times, the group was forced to leave the facility due to
fear of kidnapping by other smugglers.214 Another associate, Bart
Hernandez, took Martin to Guatemala to acquire a passport for Martin.215 It was only after the passport was acquired that Martin’s captors allowed him to leave Mexico.216 Once his contract was signed,
Lazo assisted Martin in moving across the border and flew him from
Laredo, Texas to Miami.217 Shortly after their arrival, Martin was
taken to a Merrill Lynch advisor, where Martin alleged he was coerced into signing a document written in English (a language he
could not read or understand) authorizing a transfer of $1.35 million.
The countersuit sought to retrieve the allegedly unauthorized transfer.218
Joe Kehoskie, an ex-agent who now works as a consultant for
Cuban players, explains that human trafficking for baseball players
has developed into a standard business procedure.219 He explains:
You would think it’s something [smugglers would]
be embarrassed to say or be clandestine about it. But
they say they control or own this guy – they use a
bunch of different euphemisms – and they want a
ransom. They came up with an asking price. It was
almost like going on eBay or Amazon.com. It was a
210
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212
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214
215
216
217
218
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buy-it-now price, and you’re buying human beings.220
The details of the civil suit provided the federal government with
enough evidence to indict Lazo in December 2013.221 Lazo was
charged with conspiring to smuggle, kidnap, and extort Cuban baseball players.222 Prosecutors say that Lazo was the mastermind of a
human-trafficking ring that smuggled Cubans into Mexico, where
they were held captive until the Cubans or their family members
made ransom payments.223 Lazo pled guilty to heading the smuggling venture and was sentenced to over fourteen years in federal
prison.224
In 2012, Gilberto Suarez, a South Florida businessman visiting
Mexico City, entered a taxi and instructed the driver to take him
from Mexico City to the Texas border.225 The steep $1,500 fare was
miniscule in comparison to the value of the “cargo” that joined Suarez—Yasiel Puig226 and three other Cuban baseball players.227 Suarez explained that threats from a dangerous cartel and possibly by
corrupt Mexican police threatened the players’ safety.228 While details after the drop off are unclear, court documents show that Puig
and the other men were allowed to enter the United States under the
“wet foot, dry foot” policy.229 From there, Puig was able to sign to
220
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sign his seven-year, $42 million pledge to the Los Angeles Dodgers.230 In exchange for his services, Suarez received $2.5 million.
By 2014, Puig was in the midst of his second highly successful
seasons with the Dodgers when the federal government indicted Gilberto Suarez.231 Suarez was charged with inducing a person to enter
the United States without proper identification.232 By December
2014, Suarez agreed to a plea deal.233 He was officially sentenced
on March 6, 2015 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.234 The Honorable Robert Scola sentenced
him to less than the one-year maximum penalty, sentencing Suarez
to thirty days in prison and five months of house arrest.235
At the sentencing hearing, Suarez explained that his intentions
were only to assist Puig in signing a contract with the Los Angeles
Dodgers, though the threats that he faced forced him to take the
criminal action.236 He also argued that he had nothing to do with
Puig’s smuggling out of Cuba.237 Nonetheless, Suarez pled guilty to
inducement. Given the leniency of his sentence, Judge Scola explained, “I think the safety of the player and the other [players] was
also paramount in his mind,” referring to the threats that faced Puig
and the other players.238
These two recent cases have revealed what appears to be a rampant culture of the illegal smuggling of Cuban baseball players.
What was once kept hidden from the public eye has now come to
light, given the public disclosure of such facts with these lawsuits.
At this point, it is clear that Major League Baseball is turning a blind
eye to these illegal trafficking rings. It is time that the owners, league
executives, and the MLB Player’s Association take steps towards
discouraging and dissuading smugglers from continuing to their lucrative operations. The United States courts can only do so much.
Given the improvement of diplomatic relations with the island, the
government has taken the correct step towards ending the U.S.-Cuba
230
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232
233
234
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Trade Embargo. While the end is currently a long ways away, it is
hopeful that MLB will respond in such a way as to prepare themselves for when this day finally comes.
The Cuban government has also made the process of entering
the MLB a very difficult one. In fact, the penalty is usually either
imprisonment in Cuba or suspension from the Cuban national baseball team.239 In recent years, the story of Aroldis Chapman has been
a prominent one. Chapman is a fast-throwing Cuban pitcher who
successfully moved to the United States and is currently in the Major
Leagues.240 Chapman allegedly became a government informant,
which led to the false imprisonment of a fellow Cuban citizen.241 In
a lawsuit filed by the falsely imprisoned citizen, Danilo Curbelo
Garcia contends that Chapman made a deal with Cuban officials in
2008 after a failed escape attempt, for which he was suspended from
the national team.242 By becoming a productive government informant, Chapman could prove his loyalty, earn his way back into the
good graces of the regime, and eventually return to the squad’s Alist travel roster.243 With the government thus off his back, he could
then plan his escape, which he did.244 Roberto Hernandez Del Llano
explains that “most members of the national baseball team that
travel abroad are informants for the government”.245
There is also pending litigation with Puig in the case of Miguel
Angel Corbacho Daudinot vs. Yasiel Puig Valdes and Maritza Valdes Gonzalez.246 Attorney, Avelino Gonzalez represents the plaintiff
in this case where popular sports agent Jaime Torres, who is known
See Michael E. Ruane & Scott Wilson, Cubans Meet The Orioles In Historic
Matchup: Game Seen as Tool To Ease Hostility, WASH. POST, May 4, 1999, at
A4 (reporting that Cuba left talented shortstop German Mesa off their roster for
the May 3rd game in Baltimore because of suspicions that he planned to escape);
see also Tom Maloney, Cuban Could Prove AL Answer To Nomo, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., July 1, 1995, note 121, at D2 (remarking that the Cuban National
Team suspended pitcher Ariel Prieto because of his desire to flee).
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as the Scott Boras of Cuban baseball players, represented Puig.247
The lawsuit is a $12 million suit under the Torture Victims Protection Act of 1991248 for prolonged arbitrary detention and torture.
Daudinot claims that Puig had concocted a tale that he was involved
in human trafficking, resulting in his arrest, torture, and seven-year
prison sentence.249 Similar to Chapman’s story, Puig had already attempted to leave and was in trouble with the Cuban authorities.
Daudinot claims that Puig then began making up false tales about
others in order to make his way back on the national team.250 According to a Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and
Customs Enforcement agency investigation, the Cuban government
has pending litigation against anyone they catch seeking to leave the
island or help other people leave, so Cuban players do not talk about
leaving the island because they do not want to get themselves or
their family and friends in trouble.251 However, Puig, similar to
Chapman, was also still trying to secretly escape the country for the
MLB.252 Yunior Despaigne is a key witness in the case because he
is the link between Puig and Raul Pacheco (the man who arranged
the escape by offering $250,000 to Puig in exchange for 20% of the
contract).253 The dangers of the escape are evident in the fact that
Despaigne and Puig both face threats from the men involved in the
smuggling and Yandrys Leon, who was allegedly the ringleader of
the escape, has been found dead in Mexico after being killed by a
gunman.254 On December 16, 2014, Gilberto Suarez was found
guilty for arranging and financing Puig’s escape, where he then
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hoped to capitalize on the large salary Puig negotiated with the Los
Angeles Dodgers in the MLB.255
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
A. Federal and State Legislation
Even before President Obama’s announcement regarding the
normalization of diplomatic relations with Cuba, several pieces of
federal and state legislation have attempted to shape MLB policy in
regards to Cuban players. The “Baseball Diplomacy Act” (“BDA”),
a bill that has yet to find its way off of the House floor, and HB
7095, a bill approved in the state of Florida, are two examples.
1. The Baseball Diplomacy Act
In September of 1995, prior to the enactment of the Helms-Burton Act, United States Representative José Serrano first introduced
House Bill 2311, “A Bill to Waive Certain Prohibitions With Respect to Nationals of Cuba Coming to the United States to Play Organized Baseball.”256 The purpose of the proposed bill is to provide
special exceptions for Cuban nationals seeking to play baseball in
the United States.257 Specifically, in its most current proposed form
for the 113th Congress, the bill proposes “to waive certain foreign
assistance and trade and travel prohibitions under federal law regarding Cuban nationals who: (1) enter the Untied States on a visa
to play organized professional baseball, and (2) return to Cuba with
their baseball earnings.” 258 The bill also seeks to provide travel visas for players that span the duration of the baseball season and need
not be renewed (as long as the player’s contract does not change).259
Representative Serrano has attempted to propose the bill to each of
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the past ten Congresses.260 However, the proposed bill has yet to
move past the subcommittee stage.261
Although the repetitive efforts of Representative Serrano, the
United State’s current growing relationship with Cuba may allow
portions of the Baseball Diplomacy Act to come to fruition.262 First,
the travel restrictions that were barred by the embargo will soon be
lifted by the Obama administration, proved the trip is “intended to
serve religious, educational or other approved purposes.”263 Additionally, it appears that the restrictions on the amount of money Cuban relatives may send back to their home nation may soon be lifted
as well.264 These new regulations will allow for several of the provisions of the Baseball Diplomacy Act to become a reality.265
2. HB 7095
Florida state bill HB 7095 provides local governments with access to as much as $13 million annually in funding for the construction or renovation of professional sports facilities.266 Local governments own the vast majority of stadiums throughout the state of
Florida, including both Marlins Park and Tropicana Field (homes of
the Miami Marlins and Tampa Rays).267 In addition, this law applies
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to major league baseball teams with spring training facilities in Florida (including the Tigers, Blue Jays, Rays, Pirates, Mets, Orioles,
Astros, Phillies and Twins) as well as fourteen minor league teams
in Florida that play in parks owned by or on land owned by local
governments.268 However, there is a significant “catch”—the money
is not available unless MLB and MLB franchises violate Major
League Baseball rules.269 To access the funds, teams must ignore
Major League Baseball’s “third-country requirement” and instead
negotiate with Cuban baseball players as they would with players
from any other foreign country.270 Thus, to receive the funding
promised by the bill, teams must either knowingly violate MLB’s
Kuhn Directive or MLB must change its policy.271 Teams must also
report any evidence of human trafficking.272
Sponsors of the bill, State Representatives Jose Felix Diaz and
Matt Gaetz, note that the purpose of the bill is to challenge current
MLB policy regarding Cuban players.273 The law, sparked by the
unveiling of Yasiel Puig’s dangerous escape from Cuba, is a “clear
and strong call for MLB to repeal an outmoded policy.”274 Representative Diaz argues that MLB policy “benefits human traffickers
more than it does baseball . . . .Because they have limited avenues
of escape, it’s Cuban ballplayers seeking the American Dream who
are being thrown into the arms of human smugglers and drug traffickers.”275 In response, MLB released the following statement:
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While the sponsors of the bill in Florida blame MLB
policies for the role of human smugglers, they do not
provide any support for their premise that Cuban
players must rely on traffickers to [escape] to countries other than the U.S. such as Mexico or the Dominican Republic, but would not need the assistance
of traffickers to reach U.S. soil . . . .However, [the
MLB Commissioner’s Office] will meet with the
[Major League Baseball Player’s Association] to determine whether changes can be made to [MLB’s] international signing rules to reduce or eliminate the
reliance of Cuban players on criminal organizations
when leaving Cuba . . . .We also intend to speak to
the U.S. State Department about actions that the U.S.
government can take to reduce or eliminate the trafficking of Cuban baseball players. We hope that the
legislators in Florida will do the same.276
Although the bill may be a step in the right direction, it is unlikely that such state legislation will provoke widespread change in
MLB policy. Major League Baseball’s current policies are rooted in
the United States trade embargo with Cuba. The embargo stems
from multiple pieces of federal legislation. Therefore, it is unlikely
that MLB will be inclined to change its policies towards Cubans unless there is change involving the trade embargo itself. While the
normalization of relations with Cuba is a good starting point for such
action, Congress will need to repeal the embargo, and the President
may not act alone.
More importantly, however, is that Major League Baseball’s response is alarming. Calling to the legislators to provide evidence
that “Cuban players must rely on human traffickers to” escape
demonstrates that MLB has continued to turn a blind eye to the horrific circumstances in which player’s endure in order to leave the
island. Two high profile cases, of which MLB is certainly aware,
involving Cuban MLB players and human trafficking provide evidence of what appears to be a sophisticated, dangerous, and illegal
human-trafficking culture involving baseball players form Cuba.
276

Turner, supra note 271.

SUMMER 2016]

NORMALIZED RELATIONS AND MLB INFLUENCE

297

B. Scholarly Publications
Prior to the announcement to normalize relations between the
United States and Cuba, there have been a number of ways suggested to potentially fix the current turmoil involving Cuban players,
some which are still viable and could be sought further due to the
normalized relations. One publication states that even though the relations are being normalized, as long as the embargo is in effect, it
will remain illegal for Major League teams to scout and sign players
in Cuba.277 Moreover, just because the governments are seeking to
normalize relations, there still must be a lot of things done by the
respective governments, the MLB, and Cuban baseball.278
1. Eliminating Foreign-Residency Rule
An MLB official raised the possibility of eliminating the foreign-residency rule, which theoretically would eradicate organizations such as the Zetas from involving themselves in ballplayer
smuggling.279 This presumes that the U.S.-based criminals who partake in the human trafficking will be any less dangerous or harmful
than those from other countries.280 Also, because leaving Cuba for
countries like Mexico or Haiti is easier than moving directly to the
United States, immigration to these countries may be preferred rather than being caught by the U.S. Coast Guard.281
2. Lower Monetary Incentive
Another possible solution is to simply lower the money offered
to Cuban baseball players, which could disincentive the larger scale
enterprises from continued involvement in ballplayer smuggling.282
This approach could also directly target the sports agents and scouts
who work out the details of the contracts with the smugglers presumably with no regard for the morality of the dangerous procedures
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involved in escaping the island.283 Since the Cuban talent has really
exploded since 2009, the free agents are a hot commodity and sports
agents will do anything in their power to contract with ball players,
but if the bar is lowered then there is less potential for corruption by
the agents. For example, agents and scouts are attending the Cuban
player showcases in countries such as Mexico even though they
know very well that the nature with which the baseball players made
it to Mexico and living conditions are corrupt and inhumane. If the
MLB attacks the agents directly, they essentially have nothing to
lose.
3. Four Part Method
One author, Matthew Greller, suggests a four-part method toward improving U.S.-Cuba relations through baseball diplomacy,
which includes incorporating Cubans into the amateur draft.284 Greller requires: 1) the MLB, the United States, and Cuba to abolish their
exclusionary procedures; 2) then the MLB must change Rule 4(a)
and Rule 3(a)(1) to enable Cubans to participate in the amateur draft;
3) next the MLB should impose a reasonable tax on teams that sign
Cuban players in order to support Cuban scouting and infrastructure;
and 4) finally, the U.S. needs to amend existing immigration laws to
permit Cubans to play professional baseball in America without being forced to flee the country.285
4. Worldwide Draft
Another writer, Scott Cwiertny, proposed that the MLB should
adopt a worldwide draft consisting of players of foreign residency.286 This would have considerable effects on Cuban players by
abolishing free agency status for the Cubans.287 A worldwide draft
would lower the monetary incentives for agents and scouts to aggressively and unlawfully pursue players in Cuba.288 Also, the end
283
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Policy, 20 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 391, 426 (2000).
287
Id.
288
Id.
284

SUMMER 2016]

NORMALIZED RELATIONS AND MLB INFLUENCE

299

of free agency would remove bidding wars for Cuban free agents
who live outside the United States and diminish agents’ motivation
for inflating players’ abilities in order to tempt them to escape the
country. Lastly, this would lower the temptation for MLB scouts to
breach the Kuhn Directive and the current embargo.289 However,
two major issues stem from this possible solution. For one, it is unclear whether the Cuban government would be completely open to
handing its players over to the MLB.290 The Cuban baseball commissioner explains, “The Cuban people have invested in their baseball players and no one has the right to take them away.”291 Additionally, the sports agents would have little incentive to assist in the
escape of Cuba ball players because they would earn a lower salary
than they would have as free agents, and any agent breaching the
Cuban embargo would face severe penalties.292
5. Worldwide Draft – Excluding Cuba
Another alternative proposed by Rick Lopez would be to have a
worldwide draft but exclude Cuba entirely.293 Lopez believes the action to exclude Cuba from a worldwide draft would drive Congress
to take action and adopt the Baseball Diplomacy Act.294
Allowing the MLB agents and scouts to seek the Cuban talent in
third countries is more or less passive acceptance of a horrible situation. The problem is exacerbated due to the ability with which these
smugglers have obtained at a grasp on beating the system with relative ease. The smugglers have mastered the marine navigation, boat
handling, bribery, forgery, money laundering, immigration policies,
and MLB’s Collective Bargaining Agreement to figure out the best
289
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way to approach and recruit players with enticing cash payments and
promise of MLB fame.295 Unfortunately, many of the “potential prospects” may not become MLB stars. After all this, the smugglers
earn roughly 20-30% off the top line salary.296
6. Cardozo Scholarly Article
Anna Kaminsky wrote the most recent proposal, which follows
the normalized relationship announcement, in late 2015.297 Kaminsky points out that a solution may not be possible in the imminent
future.298 However, she suggests three possible solutions that the
MLB could implement to mitigate any further problems related to
the Cuban ball players.299 The first option would entail that the
MLB allow Cuban players to enter a worldwide draft.300 The second
option proposes that the MLB strategically support legislation.301
Specifically, Kaminsky makes reference to a 2014 Florida state law
that gives tax benefits to players who travel directly from Cuba to
the United States and enter the free agency draft, but unfortunately
the law violates the federal embargo.302 The final option for the
MLB that Kaminsky offers is for the MLB to initiate immediate discussions with Cuba’s baseball leaders.303
VI. THE NORMALIZATION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CUBA
Clearly, there are a myriad of issues involved with the Cuban
players fleeing for the MLB, other Cuban escapees, the people responsible for smuggling, the agents involved in recruiting, and the
MLB itself. However, the decision of the United States and Cuba to
normalize relations comes on the heels of issues unrelated to baseball. The decision to normalize relations came when U.S. contractor
Eden, supra note 7 at 3.
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297
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and “humanitarian, Alan Gross,304 and another U.S. intelligence
source305 were released from a Cuban prison after being held since
2009. Also, eased restrictions began last month when Cuba agreed
to release 53 incarcerated people it deemed political prisoners that
had been released after an agreement with Obama and Castro.306 The
normalized relations include a deal that three Cuban prisoners be
released whom were imprisoned since 2001 for espionage.307 Unfortunately, some doubters exist. Senator Marco Rubio, believes that
Obama is playing into the hands of the Castro brothers by relaxing
sanctions without any meaningful commitment to change on their
part.308
A. December 17, 2014 Announcement
On December 17, 2014, President Obama and Raul Castro made
a startling joint announcement regarding the diplomatic relationship
between the United States and Cuba. 309 In an effort to “promote
more effective change in Cuba that is consistent with U.S. support
for the Cuban people and in line with U.S. national security interests,” the White House explained that the United States will normalize and attempt to re-establish diplomatic relations with Cuba, which
were previously severed in January of 1961.310 The efforts will purportedly begin with a visit by the U.S delegation to Cuba for the
U.S.-Cuba Migration talks in January of 2015.311 The United States
will also seek to re-establish a United States embassy in Havana in
304
Alexandra Jaffe & Elise Labott, Historic thaw in U.S., Cuba standoff, CNN
(Dec. 17, 2014, 4:31 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/17/politics/obama-cubacastro-relations/ (detailing “Gross was arrested after traveling under a program
under the U.S. Agency for International Development to deliver satellite phones
and other communications equipment to the island’s small Jewish population”).
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an effort to improve human rights conditions and further democratic
reforms.312
Central to the announcement were plans to lift the heavy travel
restrictions to and from Cuba.313 The United States will expand the
allowance of general licenses to traveling to Cuba to 12 existing categories of travel:
(1) family visits; (2) official business of the U.S. government, foreign governments, and certain intergovernmental organizations; (3) journalistic activity; (4)
professional research and professional meetings; (5)
educational activities; (6) religious activities; (7)
public performances, clinics, workshops, athletic and
other competitions and exhibitions; (8) support for
the Cuban people; (9) humanitarian projects; (10) activities of private foundations or research or educational institutes; (11) exportation, importation, or
transmission of information or informational materials; and (12) certain export transactions that may be
considered for authorization under existing regulations and guidelines.314
Travelers in these categories may make arrangements with several
airlines that will now fly directly to and from Cuba.315
Additionally, the Obama administration announced plans to
raise the amount of money—remittance—Cubans may send to their
home country. Although previous action of this sort required a specific license, it will no longer require formal permission to do so.
This means that Cuban baseball players may now send money that
they earn from their contracts back to their families. This may also
allow for agents from the United States to help support Cuban players in hopes of landing them as clients. For remittance, Cuban Americans may send their relatives an unrestricted amount of money,
while Non-Cuban Americans may send up to $8,000 a year to any
Cuban national.316
312
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B. MLB Response
Following the announcement of the normalization of relations
on December 17, MLB’s Commissioner’s Office released the following statement:
Major League Baseball is closely monitoring the
White House’s announcement regarding CubanAmerican Relations. While there are not significant
details to make a realistic evaluation, we will continue to tract this significant issue, and we will keep
our clubs informed if this different direction may impact the manner in which they conduct business on
issues related to Cuba.317
It took less than three months for Major League Baseball to take its
first official action following the announcement.
In January 2015, nineteen-year old Cuban infielder, Yoan
Moncada, became the first player to apply to the OFAC for a license
following the announcement.318 Moncada had escaped to Guatemala
in August, and received a permanent residency document, a statement from a Guatemala bank as proof of residency, and a Guatemalan Identity Card.319 Based on the previous MLB rules that required
a specific license for Cubans to sign with a Major League team,
Moncada submitted a formal application to the OFAC.320 His agent,
David Hastings, received an email from the OFAC in response to
the application.321 The email confirmed that the OFAC “will not

Adam Kilgore, Normalized Relations Between Cuba and United States
Could Have ‘Drastic’ Impact on MLB, WASHINGTON POST (Dec. 17, 2014),
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grant a specific license to Cuban nationals who are already unblocked via the general license.”322 In other words, because
Moncada met the requirements of the general unblocking license—
he possessed at least two permanent residency documents from a
third country—he need not apply for the specific license. 323 By once
again altering its policies to support a preference for a general license over a specific license requirement, MLB, in effect, softened
its stance toward Cuban nationals.324 Moncada has since made his
way through the Boston Red Sox’s minor league system and developed into one of the best prospects in baseball today.325
VII. MOVING FORWARD: UNITED STATES-CUBAN BASEBALL
COALITION COMMITTEE
The above-mentioned solutions do show signs of promise if all
parties are willing to cooperate. Out of the proposed solutions, Serrano’s Baseball Diplomacy Act appears to be the most promising
and realistic one, but it has been a Bill since 1995 and has yet to be
enacted into law. Instead of seeking a solution that assumes a compromise amongst various parties, establishing a committee to align
incentives could aid in improving international relations and working towards elimination of this issue.
Now that the countries have an operative agreement in place
through the goal of normalizing relations, there is an opportunity for
the ongoing difficulties associated with Cuban players to improve
relations between the two countries and eliminate the unsafe procedures in line with the issue. A workable framework could seek to
enhance the safety involved with the process and increase the efficiency of transitions for players who would like to escape the island.
This would not be a route to encourage Cuban players to go to the
MLB. Rather, it would serve to improve the morale of the troubling
issues and reach a compromise with the involved parties. The goals

322

Id.
See id.
324
Id.
325
Baseball America Staff, Midseason Top 100 Prospects, BASEBALL
AMERICA, (Jul. 11, 2016), http://www.baseballamerica.com/minors/midseasontop-100-prospects/
323

SUMMER 2016]

NORMALIZED RELATIONS AND MLB INFLUENCE

305

of this committee will be in line with the normalized relations discussions economically, socially in encouraging stability, and in
terms of cooperation between the U.S. and Cuba.
As the two countries seek to normalize relations, the baseball
issue could be seen as a means of exacerbating the link between the
two countries, but could alternatively be used as a platform to make
the link between the two countries even stronger. Normalizing relations between the United States and Cuba can only do so much and
will likely take years to have relations completely normal. In order
to account for all of the moving parts, the negotiations could begin
by setting up a committee, which will consist of representatives
from: 1) United States government; 2) Cuban government; 3) Sports
agents; 4) Major League Baseball; 5) Serie Nacional de Béisbol; and
6) Liaisons on all ends to mediate the process, ideally from the
United Nations Charter. The representatives would be able to negotiate arrangements and provisions of the movement of players from
Cuba to other countries to ensure the legitimate concerns for individuals who seek to flee the island, while keeping the committee’s
respective interests in mind to align the goals of all groups involved.
The liaisons will ensure good faith negotiations to maintain order in
line with the United Nations Charter.
A. Parties Involved and Representatives
In order to ensure that the parties are negotiating with everyone’s
best interests in mind, certain representatives will be assigned to the
five groups on the committee, as well as intermediaries to ensure
good faith negotiations. For the United States Government and Cuban Government, current U.S. President, Barack Obama, and Cuban
President, Raul Castro, have held bilateral discussions regarding the
normalized relations. Moreover, U.S. Secretary of State, John Kerry,
and Cuban Foreign Minister, Bruno Rodriguez Parilla, have held
meetings in Cuba and at the Summit of the Americas Conference to
discuss ongoing formalities involved with the normalized relations
(i.e. setting up respective embassies). These representatives would
continue to focus on normalizing relations but could be integral
players in the resolution discussions.
For the sports agents’ representatives, people responsible for the
international relations on the Major League Baseball Player’s Association (MLBPA) Executive Board, who promulgate the Agents’
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rules and regulations, would be useful towards aligning the
MLBPA’s incentives. The main group could consist of Javier
Vasquez, International Special Assistant, Tony Clark, Executive Director, Richard Shapiro, Senior Advisor, and Leonor Barua, Associate Director of Player Services.326
The current Collective Bargaining Agreement (full agreement
between the MLB and MLBPA) is set to expire on December 1,
2016, which could be a time for newly-appointed MLB Commissioner, Rob Manfred, to execute some changes on the foreign policy
front. Manfred should also be the main representative for the MLB
on this committee. Similarly, Vice President of the International
Baseball Federation and representative for the Cuban National
League (Serie Nacional de Béisbol), Antonio Castro, would be a
good counterpart for to the MLB representative.
A recently implemented group could serve as liaison between
the MLB and Serie Nacional, the International Talent Committee,
which was created as a Basic Agreement between the Office of the
Commissioner and the MLBPA in 2012 to examine a number of areas related to the procuring of international players, including but
not limited to the exploration of the possibility of an international
draft, improving the education and acculturation programs of Clubs
at their international academies, and the development of appropriate
country-by-country plans for playing and development opportunities for players prior to draft eligibility.327 Specific to Cuba in the
current Collective Bargaining Agreement, the International Talent
Committee “will be charged with advising the MLBPA and Office
of the Commissioner on how to treat Cuban players under an amateur talent system in light of legal and political factors that affect
their signability.”328 The Committee consists of Manfred, Clark,
Shapiro, New York Mets General Manager Sandy Alderson, Tampa
Bay Rays Executive Vice President of Baseball Operations Andrew
Friedman, MLB Senior Vice President of Baseball Operations Kim
Ng.
MLBPA Info, http://mlb.mlb.com/pa/info/contact.jsp#staff.
Press Release, International Talent Committee to Seek Input from Foreign
Baseball Experts, http://m.mlb.com/news/article/26379998/international-talentcommittee-to-seek-input-from-foreign-baseball-experts.
328
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1. United States Government
The respective government’s involvement could serve as a
means of ensuring that there is full transparency with regards to the
international relations and continued discussions between Obama
and Castro and Kerry and Rodriguez. The U.S. Government is unlikely to be able to play too much of a role with regards to the substantive baseball involvement. However, the current economic embargo in place does not allow Cubans to play in the MLB without
first escaping the country. This could be an area of focus to reach a
compromise for the U.S. Government.
Moreover, it appears that the U.S. Government is likely willing
to reach an agreement with other parties according to MLB Chief
Legal Officer, Dan Halem. Halem remarked that the MLB asked the
Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)
for a specific license in early June to enter into a deal with the Cuban
government that will allow MLB to sign Cuban players.329 Halem
went on to say, “There’s a willingness on the part of our government
to end the trafficking. The White House has been very sympathetic
to helping us end some of the abusive practices.” 330
2. Cuban Government
Similar to the U.S. Government’s role, the Cuban Government
could use this problem as a means to continued communications between the U.S. counterparts. In the normalized relations communications, it’s been stated that Castro and Cuba do not plan on changing too much of their structure internally. However, even though
Raul Castro is similar to his predecessor, Fidel, with regards to
maintaining a passion for baseball within Cuba, he has made the exception to allow Cuban players to play abroad in Japan and Mexico
so may be apt to a more lenient travel policy for Cuban baseball
players. This approach remains to be seen in respects to the MLB
but due to the precedent of allowing Cuba players abroad in other
countries and continued communications, it is important to have
Castro and Rodriguez on the Committee.
Daniel Trotta, Major League Baseball Asks Permission to Sign Cuban
Players, REUTERS (Dec. 24, 2015 at 8:53AM), http://www.kcrg.com/content/sports/Major-League-Baseball-Asks-Permission-to-Sign-Cuban-Players363463811.html.
330
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As evident by a December 2015 goodwill return of a few Cuban
players, it appears that the Cuban Government is also open to utilizing baseball as a means of U.S.-Cuban diplomacy. President of the
Cuban Baseball Federation, Higinio Velez, stated “This demonstrates that Cuba is open to the world, that we are not closed, not
even with our players who are playing in MLB.”
3. Sports Agents’
As noted above, an area that could aid towards rehabilitating the
issue is for the MLB to crack down on sports agents’ aggressive activity towards the Cuban players. On the MLBPA Executive Board,
Vasquez, Clark, Shapiro, and Barua would be the structural backbone to implement proper guidelines for sports agents in this area.
Sports agents tend to have an unequal bargaining power in many
situations and the discrepancy is exacerbated in Cuba where the individuals are risking a lot more by leaving behind their family, but
could be swayed by the perceived promise of a life filled with extravagance. Already, a few sports agents have got in trouble from
taking advantage of the issue as indicated previously with the agents
Suarez and Dominguez.
The MLBPA Executive Board members that I selected have
been the most involved with international relations, players, and
sports agents. These members will also be at the forefront of negotiations to changes in the Collective Bargaining Agreement for December 1, 2016. The Executive Board likely does not have to come
down directly on the sports agents with harsh guidelines and it is in
their best interest to be respectful of the norms of the field, but structuring some protocol in the CBA with regards to the changes in international relations could be a good starting point to develop some
order.
4. Major League Baseball
Newly assigned MLB Commissioner, Rob Manfred, is adamant
about an approach to creating a better avenue to link Cuba and
America on the baseball front. Manfred is in a good spot to make
some decisions right now as he starts out his tenure in a few different
areas. With regards to the new CBA Agreement, Manfred will have
a lot of decision-making power in changes to the agreement to align
with the normalized relations agreement. Moreover, with the MLB
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All-Star Game in Miami in 2016, just 200 miles from Cuba,
Manfred could implement some activities involving Cuba in the
weeklong event.
While these are two areas where Manfred and the MLB can
make stark alterations to the current ambiguous agreements, he recently announced there are other short term and long-term ventures
the League hopes to embark on. For now, Manfred said he hopes to
stage exhibition games in Cuba next spring to advance the process
of restoring baseball ties with the Caribbean nation.331 In the longterm, Manfred stated that “[o]ver the long haul, we’d like to see a
more regularized process for Cuban players to come to the United
States and, if they want, return to Cuba. It’s really important to us to
have the best athletes in the world playing Major League Baseball
and we think a more regularized immigration process would help us
in that regard.”332
5. Serie Nacional de Béisbol
Along the same lines as the MLB approach, the Cuban Baseball
equivalent, Serie Nacional de Béisbol and its decision makers, are
optimistic about pushing for closer ties with American baseball. Antonio Castro, son of Fidel and VP of the International Baseball Federation, is all for Cuban players participating in international
leagues. In an interview, Castro said “I think our ballplayers who
trained here earned the right to go play in other leagues and measure
themselves against a higher level. They should be able to do it without fear - and come back and play with their national team.”333
Similarly, while the culture formerly used to be averse towards Cuban players leaving their home country for the MLB, a lot of the fans
enjoy seeing these players succeed at the highest level in the MLB.
Castro states further that “the problem exists and [Cuba and MLB]
need to resolve this. The question is, why not? Why don’t we find
the solution? The only thing we need is the will to do that. For sure
Maria Guardado, Rob Manfred says MLB is ‘Anxious to Move Forward on
Cuba’, NJ.COM (July 25, 2015 at 8:55 PM), http://www.nj.com/yankees/index.ssf/2015/07/rob_manfred_says_mlb_is_anxious_to_move_forward_on.html.
332
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we can find a solution, but we need to work together - everybody.”334 With the Major League season being so long, allowing
players to return during the offseason to play would not be ideal due
to possibilities of burnout. However, Castro appears to be optimistic
about discussing options to reach a compromise for the leagues that
could entail a simpler avenue for the players and improving the current system.
6. Liaisons
There are a couple of liaisons that could serve on both the baseball and international relations front. The aforementioned International Talent Committee can come in to monitor that proper negotiating is taking place between the Cuban baseball and American
baseball representatives. Also, as the representatives for international relations in the current CBA, they could help in amending the
provisions related to international relations with Cuba to align with
the normalized relations agreement and ongoing discussions.
The other group that could help monitor the entire Committee
and specifically U.S.-Cuban relations is the United Nations Charter.
In the United Nations General Assembly, the most applicable committees to monitor the Baseball Committee are the Second (Economic and Financial Committee) and Third (Social, Humanitarian,
and Cultural). To maintain order and to keep the discussion on the
topics related to improving the morale, good faith negotiations, and
improving the troubling immigration issue, the U.N. Charter will be
a strong mediator to watch over all parties and the discussions. To
keep the conversations in line with the normalized relations documents, the U.N. Charter can serve as liaison to remind everyone of
the economic and social goals of each country. Also, they can help
maintain security and boundaries on any discussions that get out of
hand or are too lopsided. Chapter VI, Article 34 of the U.N. Charter
states “the Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation, which might lead to international friction or give rise to a
dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute
or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international
peace and security.” This clause could ensure that the two countries
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that have had friction for over five decades will be on the same page
towards the normalizing relations documents.
B. Aligning Incentives
There is currently no one-size-fits-all solution, but getting a
Committee like this together involving the U.S. Government, Cuban
Government, Sports Agents, MLB, and Serie Nacional could be a
first step towards addressing the major platforms for change as the
countries continue advancing the normalized relations. The current
MLB CBA already has verbiage in place that is subject to change
based on the political relationship. The document is set to expire on
December 1, 2016, and more concrete language can be put in its
place based on discussions amongst the Committee and in the normalized relations agreement. Important areas to address are to account for players who do not end up making it to the MLB who have
fled the island, improving the ease and access to the difficulties associated with escaping the island, possible events to improve morale
between the countries (spring training and All-Star Game), and
keeping both countries satisfied. The end result will not necessarily
be for the countries to reach an agreement where Cuban players can
travel back-and-forth freely to the U.S., but where both countries do
not feel slighted and the process becomes safer (i.e. could be to add
incentives/concessions for players to stay in Cuba instead of venturing into the escape process).
The MLB and new commissioner, Rob Manfred, have a great
opportunity to oversee all the relations with sports agents and create
new avenues for Cuban baseball and the MLB through bilateral and
unilateral solutions. Manfred could amend the MLB CBA on December 1, 2016 in regard to Cuban relations to align with international relations as normalized relations continue for the better. The
MLB is currently under a lot of scrutiny for turning a blind eye to
these problems, so Manfred could play a big role in keeping the
owners’, agents’, and players’ goals in line while maintaining an
ethical stream in the enterprise. Manfred could also increase the exposure for Cuban baseball in the US by having an international game
in the 2017 All-Star Game, which will be played close to Cuba in
Miami. The All-Star Game has decreased in prestige over the year
as the MLB has attempted to increase it’s glamour by making it
count for home field in the World Series for the winning League
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(American or National), but the popularity has definitely decreased.
However, the weeklong Summer Classic has various events
throughout the host city. If the MLB and the Marlins leverage the
Cuban influence in Miami that week - especially by showcasing the
Cuban talent - players, fans, and teams will all be interested in this
rising talent pool. Hosting a Cuban All-Star team vs. an American
All-Star team could be included as a festivity for the week. The revenue stream from concessions involving Cuban players/influence
can be apportioned to the Cuban government. Alternatively,
Manfred also would like to see American baseball in Cuba via exhibition games, which could happen as soon as 2016 Spring Training.335
All parties should look at baseball as a way to help the normalized relations run more smoothly and not as a channel that could
deter the possible growth of the relationship. In recent months, there
have already been strides made.
Notably, Puig and Jose Abreu returned to Cuba, their homeland,
for the first time since fleeing via boat in 2012 and 2013, respectively, on December 15, 2015.336 The return home for the Cuban
players was part of an MLB delegation that hosted workshops and
meetings with Cuban officials on a four-day tour.337 The trip occurred at the one-year anniversary of the normalized relations agreement and was made possible due to the thaw in U.S.-Cuban relations.
The change in U.S.-Cuba relations did have an immediate impact on the signing process for Cuban prospects as was evident in
the case involving Moncada.338 Moreover, in September 2015, the
MLB granted waivers for Jonathan Machado and Omar Estevez,
who left Cuba but missed the deadline to register for the 2015-16
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international signing period.339 Machado and Estevez were still in
Cuba on the May 15 deadline, but, under the MLB’s collective
agreement, the MLB can waive the registration deadline when an
international prospect has a “compelling justification.”340 The use of
the CBA provision marks the first waiver for Cuban players, which
shows that the MLB may be opening up to the situation of Cuban
baseball players.341
There are even greater strides being made on the diamond between Serie Nacional and United States baseball.342 In November
2015, the Penn State baseball team became the first United States
team—amateur or professional—to compete against teams from the
Cuban National Series.343 Albeit, the competition did not involve an
MLB team, but the Penn State Nittany Lions had the opportunity to
become fully immersed in the Cuban culture during the trip.
While the college roster made huge strides with their November
game, an MLB team engaged in a similar competition in the spring
of 2016. The Tampa Bay Rays beat the Cuban national team 4-1 in
the landmark game, which marked the first time an MLB team
played in Cuba since the Orioles played there in 1999.344 The weekday game also involved a historic visit by President Obama as he
became the first sitting U.S. President to travel to Cuba in 88
years.345 While there were huge benefits an the historic game was
largely positive, there was some negative resentment from Cuban
339
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protestors, which signifies that a lot still must be done before the
countries are entirely civil with one another.346 Moreover, this
shows that baseball is serving as a large platform in the normalizing
relations process.
With that being said, the game is a large stride and opens up the
opportunities for all parties to open up the foreign relationships even
more. The MLB could utilize the game as a platform to continue to
play exhibition games in Cuba or to increase Cuban baseball involvement by way of the 2017 All-Star Game to be played in an area
with a lot of Cuban ties, Miami.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The proper solution will appease the MLB’s view by being able
to sign the Cuban players without having to deal with the negative
publicity of the awful process, or, alternatively, allow Cuban players
the option to have more flexibility in career endeavors. It will also
bring the relations between the U.S. and Cuba closer together and
please the Cuban players and their families so that they feel as
though they have flexibility to go back to Cuba and do not have to
experience a circuitous route just to play in the MLB. Additionally,
the solution will appease sports agents by allowing them an opportunity to fairly negotiate deals with the players without any negative
morality surrounding the situation.
Regardless, the situation will take a while to completely mitigate. However, something where all parties are addressed could
smooth the relations with regard to the countries and baseball in general. In the short term, it is unlikely that the normalized relations will
have much of an impact on the current procedures Cuban players go
through to enter the MLB. In the long term, hopefully the problematic system is something that can be smoothed out.
“Knowing the history of things, I would think that baseball will
be one of the slowest things to change, because it is such a major
institution in Cuba,” Bjarkman said. “If they ever worked out some
agreement on this down the road, well, it may happen eventually.
But Obama announcing in Washington that they’re going to ease the
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embargo, and [Raul Castro] announcing that he wants smoother diplomatic relations to the U.S., that doesn’t mean the baseball situation
changes.”347
If the goal is truly to normalize relations, then the restrictions in
place currently that are causing a lot of hardship on various parties
should be relaxed. Setting up a formal United States-Cuban Baseball
Coalition Committee will help with reaching agreements and taking
small steps to amending and creating documents pertinent to the issue.

Travis Waldron, The MLB’s Cuba Problem, THINK PROGRESS (Dec. 18,
2014, 10:31 AM),
http://thinkprogress.org/sports/2014/12/18/3604720/cuba-embargo-obama-normalized-relations-major-league-baseball/.
347

